دانلود رایگان مقاله لاتین کاربرد عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی در زنجیره تامین از سایت الزویر
عنوان فارسی مقاله:
استفاده از عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی برای کاهش ضعف در زنجیره تامین
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
Using information asymmetry to mitigate hold-ups in supply chains
سال انتشار : 2015
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بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی:
2. Theory and hypothesis development
2.1. Hold-ups In the context of the supply chain, buyers and sellers often find that their working relationships carry both benefits and risks (Anderson and Sedatole, 2003; Dekker, 2004). These relationships can range from a close alliance established over time to a “new” relationship wherein one party must take the risk of making an isolated relation-specific investment for the purpose of increasing the surplus available to both parties. We examine the latter type of relationship—that is, the “new” relationship wherein the investor cannot draw on prior experience with the non-investor to make their investment decision—and investigate how to encourage such investment. Suppose an important automobile original equipment manufacturer (OEM) demands that a supplier locate their facility or a warehouse near their assembly plant or develop an information system that is compatible with the buyer’s database (cf. Bensaou, 1999). This will increase the size of the surplus to be divided between the seller and the buyer ex post (i.e., after the investment has been made) whilst also rendering the seller captive of this relationship. Sellers need to decide whether they will enter into this type of relationship and investin a relation-specific asset.1 Their investment decision is influenced by the comparison of their share of the surplus with and without the investment. If the seller makes the relation-specific investment, it will create a source of monopoly power for the OEM who, during trade, could choose to appropriate the difference between the anticipated value of the investment within this relationship and its value outside the relationship (Joskow, 1985). An information system designed to be compatible with a specific OEM database or the relocation of the seller’s facility near that specific OEM will have little to no value outside the relationship with this OEM. Thus, in the absence of the OEM’s commitment to not appropriate the surplus generated by the seller’s relocation or information system, the seller risks being worse off after his investment than before, having incurred the cost of the investment but derived no benefit from it. With this in mind, the seller, who has no incentive to invest, decides against making the relation-specific investment. This suboptimal decision caused by the expected self-interested trade behavior of the buyer constitutes the hold-up problem presented by transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975, 1985). Studies examining hold-ups and the associated commitment problem abound and are primarily supported by investigations from transaction cost economics. In general, these studies assume self-interested behavior by the non-investor and conclude that since vertical integration and contracts offer some protection to the investor during trade, they can help to remedy hold-ups (cf. Shelanski and Klein, 1995). Vertical integration and contracts, however, are costly remedies whose effectiveness varies with the type of relation-specific investment made. While contracts can be effective with selfish relation-specific investments, they are ineffective when investments are cooperative and parties cannot commit to not renegotiating (Baiman and Rajan, 2002a; Che and Hausch, 1999).
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کلمات کلیدی:
Integrated and Strategic Advancements in Decision Making Support Systems https://books.google.com/books?isbn=1466617470 Zaraté, Pascale - 2012 - Business & Economics ... the risks from hold-up and opportunism previously associated with a capability ... For example, IT can reduce information asymmetry and thus help facilitate ... [PDF]Mitigating Incentive Conflicts in inter-Firm Relationships https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/accounting/papers/Costello.pdf by AM Costello - Cited by 62 - Related articles Suppliers hold asymmetric information about the quality of their products and their ..... contracts to mitigate potential hold-up problems associated with specific ... [PDF]Reducing Hold-up Risks in Ethanol Supply Chains: A ... - IFAMA https://www.ifama.org/resources/Documents/v17i2/Weseen-Hobbs-Kerr.pdf by S Weseen - 2014 - Cited by 8 - Related articles strategies are in use to mitigate hold-up risks? ..... In the presence of information asymmetry, .... transaction costs will be lower and the risk of hold-up declines.
