دانلود رایگان مقاله لاتین هزینه های اطلاعات نامتقارن در ورود به بازار اوراق قرضه از سایت الزویر
عنوان فارسی مقاله:
ورود به بازار اوراق قرضه دولتی در طول بحران مالی: سرمایه گذاری نامناسب و هزینه های اطلاعات نامتقارن
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
Entering the public bond market during the financial crisis: Underinvestment and asymmetric information costs
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بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی:
2. Theories and research hypothesis
Myers (1977) argues that the conflict between shareholders and debt-holders in the form of underinvestment problems arises in high-growth firms in which shareholders are disincentivised to invest in positive-NPV projects due to the partial payoff that debt-holders receive from these positive projects. The more valuable growth options the firms has, the greater the degree of the underinvestment problem. This problem can be mitigated by lowering leverage or shortening the debt maturity, which will allow valuable growth opportunities to be taken (Myers, 1977). Barclay and Smith (1995) suggest that a firms’ future investment is considered as options that its value depends on the likelihood of exercising the options optimally. Since firms with greater investment opportunities have higher conflicts between shareholders and debt-holders over the exercise of the options, riskier projects are more easily substituted for less risky ones. In addition, positive NPV projects are more susceptible to be forgone.Within the agency costs theory, Myers (1977) argues that high-growth firms are expected to rely on lower levels of debt to mitigate their underinvestment problems. Consistently, Krishnaswami et al. (1999) find that private debt typically monitors firms’ operating and investment decisions to mitigate the underinvestment problem. Therefore, it is expected that firms with higher growth opportunities have less incentive to undertake their bond IPOs, as their shareholders can more easily substitute riskier projects for less risky ones, and are also more vulnerable to forgoing positive NPV projects (Krishnaswami et al., 1999). In particular, it is more likely that firms can mitigate the underinvestment problem by using more equity financing to delay their entry into the public bond market. Therefore the first hypothesis is: H1: Firms with underinvestment problems are less likely to issue their first public bonds and wait for a longer period of time to issue their first public bond. Diamond (1991) uses information asymmetry and firms’ reputation in considering the decision as to debt source. He suggests that the decision to grant debt depends on firms’ public information. In particular, if a firm’s reputation is high enough, the adverse selection problem can be mitigated by the fact that collecting information is not costly for high-rated firms; while financial intermediaries, including banks, can monitor firms’ information for low-rated firms, subject to a cost. Based on these notions, Diamond (1991) shows that middle-rated borrowers, whose reputation is not high enough to mitigate the adverse selection problem, are not able to issue debt directly and thus rely on bank debt. In contrast, high-rated borrowers do not need the monitoring role of banks and therefore can place debt directly. Lastly, low-quality firms have less to lose if they reveal bad news about themselves, not only by defaulting, but also by being caught when monitored. In this case, monitoring is not worth its cost and hence does not provide incentives for them to use bank debt. These implications show a non-monotonic relationship between a firm’s reputation and debt source.
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کلمات کلیدی:
Euro Bonds: Markets, Infrastructure And Trends https://books.google.com/books?isbn=9814440175 Bertocchi Marida, Consigli Giorgio, Giacometti Rosella - 2013 - Business & Economics The period however witnessed a lack of effective public balance control, ... During the financial crisis, the German Bund seems to have benefited from the safe ... At this point the entire Euro government bond market entered the current crisis. [PDF]Debt Markets: Policy Challenges in the Post- Crisis ... - OECD.org www.oecd.org/finance/public-debt/45988118.pdf by HJ Blommestein - 2010 - Cited by 20 - Related articles Keywords: Outlook on public deficits and government debt, crisis and debt management ..... the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, the session on “Changes in Primary and Secondary Market .... Re-entering the market during the crisis is very ...
