دانلود رایگان مقاله لاتین عملکرد هیئت مدیره در شرکت خانوادگی از سایت الزویر
عنوان فارسی مقاله:
عملکرد نقش هیئت مدیره و faultlines در شرکت های خانوادگی: نقش تعدیل ارزیابی هیئت مدیره رسمی
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
Board role performance and faultlines in family firms: The moderating role of formal board evaluation
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مقدمه انگلیسی مقاله:
1. Introduction
A growing body of literature focuses on identifying theunderlying mechanisms that explain differences in board roleperformance among family firms and calls for more research on thegroup dynamics that are present in these boards (Bammens,Voordeckers, & Van Gils, 2011; Collin & Ahlberg, 2012; Zattoni,Gnan, & Huse, 2015). In the specific setting of family firms, wherethe board can be composed of both family members and outsiders,the roles and behaviours of family versus other board membersmay be different due to possibly diverging viewpoints andinterests (Bammens et al., 2011). For instance, Anderson and Reeb(2004) suggested that independent directors play a role inalleviating conflicts between shareholder groups and mitigatingthe family’s power, which presented an opportunity for performancepremiums for family-owned firms with higher levels ofboard independence. Moreover, families may nominate thoseoutside directors to heighten the task-relevant skills of their board(Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Bammens et al., 2011; Zattoni et al., 2015).While this greater diversity in the boardroom seems beneficial forperformance, owing to the increased availability of functionalknowledge and skills, there are downsides to be considered as well.One of these potential downsides, is the emergence of groupfaultlines, “hypothetical dividing lines that may split a group intosubgroups based on one or more attributes” (Lau & Murnighan,1998, p. 328). These faultlines may be grounded in demographicattributes, such as gender, as well as nondemographic characteristics,such as certain family attributes. The concept of faultlines isbased on the alignment of several diversity attributes ofindividuals, and faultlines become stronger as more characteristicsalign themselves in the same way (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). Forexample, in a board composed of two female family executivedirectors and two male outside directors, based on the alignmentof three attributes (i.e., gender, family membership and type ofdirectorship) two homogenous subgroups are likely formed,creating a strong faultline. Family members are expected to createa highly committed “in-group” (Uhlaner, Wright, & Huse, 2007), asthey may prefer working with other members of the family andmay trust them more than outsiders. Subgroup formation in turncould have a detrimental effect on board cohesiveness, which islinked to board role performance (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).To our knowledge, only two studies have focused on faultlinesin the context of family firms. Firstly, Minichilli, Corbetta, andMacMillan (2010) argue that the proportion of family members inthe top management team (TMT) will lead to faultlines amongfactions of family and nonfamily top executives. They found a Ushapedrelationship between the ratio of family members in thetop management team and firm financial performance, with afaultline occurring when there is a “balanced” representation of family and nonfamily members in the TMT. Another study,conducted by Basco and Voordeckers (2015), expected faultlinesin the boards of private family firms between outside and insidedirectors, and found an inverted U-shaped pattern in therelationship between the outside director ratio and firm performance.However, in spite of the important contributions of theirfindings, these studies link faultlines to firm performance.Governance studies have been focusing on finding a relationshipbetween board demographics and firm outcomes (Daily, Dalton, &Cannella Jr, 2003; Johnson, Ellstrand, & Daily, 1996). However,contrasting findings and insignificant results (Dalton, Daily,Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Pettigrew, 1992) have resulted in anongoing search for the mechanisms that link input variables, suchas board composition, to output variables, such as firm financialperformance (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2005;van Ees, Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2009; Westphal & Zajac, 2013). Togain more understanding of the intervening processes throughwhich board demographics influence firm performance, researchersmust explore the effect of board demographics on boardfunctioning and role performance. Moreover, our knowledge of theinfluence of complex group dynamics on board role performancein general, and especially in the specific setting of family firms,remains limited. We attempt to fill this gap in the literature byaddressing the following research question: what is the effect ofgroup faultlines on board role performance in family firms?Previous studies either use the family ratio or outsider ratio toexplain the phenomenon of faultlines in the specific context offamily firms. In order to really capture the effect of faultlines, asfirst conceptualized by Lau and Murnighan (1998), a more preciseway of measuring and identifying faultlines and subgroups infamily firms is recommended. Therefore, we use the method ofShaw (2004), which assesses the extent to which categoricalattributes are aligned within subgroups and deviate betweensubgroups. This provides us with a more encompassing measure offaultlines, since this method incorporates multiple attributes.More specifically, we will take the attributes “family membership”(i.e., part of the family or not), “type of directorship” (i.e., executive,nonexecutive or other) and “gender” into account.Furthermore, there is still no general agreement about theeffect of faultlines and resulting subgroups on group performance,as there are also scholars who argue that faultlines are notnecessarily detrimental. For example, Bezrukova and Uparna(2009) claim that stronger faultlines can stimulate a culture shiftfrom a desired to an actual culture of creativity in a team, which inturn might influence the team’s creativity and performance. Thesecontradictory results may be the result of the highly contextualnature of the effect of faultlines (Meyer, Glenz, Antino, Rico, &González-Romá, 2014). That is, there may be some contexts wherethe faultline effects are exacerbated, or potentially mitigated.An important attribute of the board’s context, which has beenmainly overlooked in previous board research, is the formalevaluation of the board of directors. Indeed, board evaluations canserve as an opportunity to discuss potential faultline issues whichcould help counteract the detrimental effects of faultlines. Inaddition, board evaluation may have a positive effect on theidentification of the members with the board as a whole, therebystimulating board cohesiveness, which in turn has the potential toindirectly influence board role performance (Forbes & Milliken,1999; Zona, 2015). As Edmondson, Dillon, and Roloff (2007) stated,low identification with the group as a whole, or low “collectiveteam identification,” leads to difficulties when trying to capturethe benefits of diversity for learning, which in turn is an importantcomponent of team effectiveness (Edmondson et al., 2007).Building on previous studies that assert the potential detrimentaleffect of faultlines on group-level outcomes (Bezrukova, Jehn,Zanutto, & Thatcher, 2009; Choi and Sy, 2010; Rico, Molleman,Sanchez-Manzanares, & Vegt, 2007; Thatcher, Jehn, & Zanutto,2003), our study aims at unravelling the implications of faultlineson board role performance in boards that use formal evaluations aswell as in those that do not.We provide several contributions to the field. First, we examinethe effect of faultlines in the specific setting of family firms, asfamily characteristics may have important implications for thepresence of faultlines (Bammens et al., 2011; Collin & Ahlberg,2012; Zattoni et al., 2015). Second, by adopting principles from theorganizational behaviour literature, this study contributes to theemergent dialogue on group dynamics in boards of directors. Ourstudy responds to calls in the corporate governance literature toopen up the “black box” of corporate boards (Huse, Hoskisson,Zattoni, & Viganò, 2011), as we investigate the faultline effect onthe board level and gain a better understanding of the antecedentsof board role performance in family firms. Third, we contribute byempirically testing the relationship between faultlines and boardrole performance, using a comprehensive method of calculatingfaultlines. By adding the variable “family membership” as anadditional social category attribute, this study adds to the faultlineliterature, which has not yet considered this characteristic. Lastly,we investigate the effect of formal board evaluation on therelationship between faultlines and board role performance, whichalso contributes to practice, as board evaluation may represent asolution to bridge potential negative faultline effects.
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کلمات کلیدی:
Board role performance and faultlines in family firms: the moderating ...https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/.../board-role-performance-and-faultlines-in-family...by A Vandebeek - 2016 - Related articlesJul 1, 2016 - Board role performance and faultlines in family firms: the moderating role of formal board evaluation. Research output: Other research output › ...Board role performance and faultlines in family firms: The ... - ISI-dlisi-dl.com/item/136338Toggle navigation logo. Free Journal Paper Download. Sources ?? 206.200 · acm.org · acs.org · aiaa.org · aip.org · ajhp.org · ajnr.org · ajronline.org · ajsonline.Strategic Management: Concepts: Competitiveness and Globalizationhttps://books.google.com/books?isbn=1337413577Michael A. Hitt, R. Duane Ireland, Robert E. Hoskisson - 2016 - Business & EconomicsEvidence from family business groups in Hong Kong. ... External COO/presidents as expert directors: A new look at the service role of boards, ... J. Horstkotte, , Performance effects of top management team demographic faultlines in the process ...Strategic Management: Concepts and Cases: Competitiveness and ...https://books.google.com/books?isbn=1285425170Michael A. Hitt, R. Duane Ireland, Robert E. Hoskisson - 2014 - Business & EconomicsD. L. Deephouse & P. Jaskiewicz, 2013, Do family firms have better reputations ... 'Familiness', 'faultlines', and 21. their impact on financial performance, 22. ... 2011, Board leadership and strategy involvement in small firms: A team production ...Board role performance and faultlines in family firms: the moderating ...biblioteca.universia.net/.../board-role-performance-and-faultlines-i...Translate this pageBoard role performance and faultlines in family firms: the moderating role of formal board evaluation. 1) La descarga del recurso depende de la página de ...Board Role Performance And Faultlines In Family Firms The ...biblioteca.universia.net/.../board-role-performance-and-faultlines-i...Translate this pageboard role performance and faultlines in family firms: the moderating role of formal board evaluation recent research on the actual behaviour of board.AdEarthquake Fault Maps - Search Earthquake Fault MapsAdwww.zapmeta.ws/Search_The_WebFind Earthquake Fault Maps. Search Faster, Better & Smarter at ZapMeta Now!Trusted by Millions · Information 24/7 · 100+ Million Visitors · Wiki, News & MoreFind MoreSearch & Find NowRelated InfoMulti Search
