دانلود رایگان مقاله لاتین شبیه سازی بازی تکاملی از سایت الزویر


عنوان فارسی مقاله:

برای اجرای پایدار سیاست های کاهش کربن تحت یک شبیه سازی بازی تکاملی


عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:

For the sustainable performance of the carbon reduction labeling policies under an evolutionary game simulation


سال انتشار : 2016



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بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی:


2. Literature review

 2.1. Application of game theory to green consumption Game theory focuses on the interactions among conflicted players whose strategic behaviors are influenced by their payoffs (Wu et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2015). For the past 50 years, it has been widely applied to a number of global issues such as technological innovation, power management, supply chain management, and resource allocation (Campos-Nañez et al., 2008; Leng and Parlar, 2009; Zhao et al., 2012b; Marden and Wierman, 2013; Daming et al., 2014). However, the application of game theory to green consumption is in progress. For instance, Conrad (2005) built a duopoly game to determine how a consumer's environmental preference affects the prices, product characteristics, and market shares of competing firms. The result indicated that appropriate subsidy and taxation policies could incentivize firms to seek the optimal distribution of green products in the market. The same approach was taken by Rodríguez-Ibeas (2007), who divided consumers into two categories (green and brown) and developed a duopoly game to investigate how a consumer's environmental awareness affects environmental quality and social welfare. The author highlighted that environmental awareness is a key factor in reducing pollution as long as the marginal costs of environmentally friendly products are sufficiently low. Similarly, Liu et al. (2012) developed a two-stage Stackelberg game model to investigate the impact of consumers' environmental awareness on key supply chain stakeholders such as manufacturers and retailers. They found that environmental awareness was positively related to the profit of retailers and that superior eco-friendly operations could increase the profitability of manufacturers. In addition, Cohen et al. (2015) proposed a two-stage Stackelberg game to model the interaction between the government and suppliers of green technology, identifying that subsidies offered to consumers influence a supplier's decision making on pricing, which could raise consumer surplus. Ibanez and Grolleau (2008) developed a three-stage game model and indicated that eco-labeling schemes were an environmentally effective policy as long as they set appropriate labeling costs. Indeed, Bleda and Valente (2009) indicated that when consumers were provided with appropriate information on the greenness of products via ecolabels, producers were driven to reduce the environmental impact of their products. Jamalpuria (2012) introduced a fiscal incentive in the form of a tax rebate to promote the application of eco-labels by using a duopoly game. However, the author found that an eco-labeling scheme alone was not sufficiently efficient to internalize all the negative externalities of green consumption. For instance, the higher priced green product may lead to greater market uncertainty (Windrum et al., 2009; Diaz-Rainey and Tzavara, 2012). Wing et al. (2011) argued that preferential taxation policy was important for promoting green consumption, while Hu (2012) also identified subsidy and green design as additional factors that support the survival of market competition. Lorek and Spangenberg (2014) confirmed that incentives were indispensable to drive green consumption. However, Hu et al. (2014) pointed out that the effectiveness of Pigouvian tax and subsidy policies depended on the product characteristics. While these previous studies are useful for informing our approach, most assume that consumers' environmental preference or awareness is a constant or discrete function, which results in fixed market demand. Moreover, incentives to promote green consumption are mostly considered to be given to corporations rather than to consumers. This study thus adds to the literature by incorporating the dynamic change in market demand for carbon-labeled products as well as the direct subsidy given to consumers into the game theoretical analysis to investigate the possible influences on enterprises.



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کلمات کلیدی:

[PDF]Effective approaches to environmental labelling of food products www.psi.org.uk/pdf/2011/food_labelling/annex_a.pdf Nov 15, 2010 - Environmental labels: Types, performance and policy context . ... Eco-labels and policy . .... 40. 5.3.3. Carbon Reduction Label . Ecology, Sustainable Development and Accounting https://books.google.com/books?isbn=1135070547 Seleshi Sisaye - 2015 - ‎Business & Economics policies, particularly towards the environmental management of the biophysical ... increasing efficiencies and reducing carbon dioxide emissions, businesses can ... and services that are eco-labeled as indicators of sustainability performance. End-use efficiency to lower carbon emissions - IEEE Xplore Document ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/911345/ by C Marnay - ‎2001 - ‎Cited by 2 - ‎Related articles ... performance standards and labels promise enormous carbon emissions ... move economies towards more sustainable energy use and assist in the attaining Kyoto ... Chris Marnay is a staff scientist in the Electricity Markets and Policy Group, ... [PDF]Environmental Sustainability Policy - Earth Friendly Products ecos.com/assets/uploads/2013/10/EFP-Sustainability-Policy-edited2016.pdf Audit environmental and sustainability performance. •. Review this .... saving in implementing all cost-effective carbon reduction measures. •. 'Reduce .... switched off. “SWITCH IT OFF” labels are applied to electrical appliances (monitors,.