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عنوان فارسی مقاله:
چگونگی اجتناب بررسی دقیق ضد تراست نظارتی: دفاع رفتاری
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
How to avoid regulatory antitrust scrutiny: The behavioral defense
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بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی :
Antitrust authorities generally rely on a few traditional measures of competition to assess the market power of firms and the likelihood of anticompetitive practices: the four firm concentration ratio (CR), the Herfindahl index (HF), and the price-cost margin (Bishop & Walker, 2002). As regards the CR and the HF, the higher these values, the lower the competition in the industry. But in duopoly markets (where firms have high market power), firms like Boeing and Airbus, Nike and Adidas, or Coke and Pepsi have hardly depicted anticompetitive behavior compared to firms in oligopolistic markets. For example, in 2008, Unilever, Procter & Gamble, Colgate, Cussons, and Woolworths colluded to fix prices of detergents in the Australian market. Similarly, in Germany, Mars, Hershey, Nestle´, Kraft Foods, and Cadbury were alleged to have participated in antitrust activities in 2010 (Lorin, 2008). In France, players like Unilever, Colgate-Palmolive, Henkel, and Procter & Gamble were found to be guilty of cartel formation by the European Union (Colchester & Passariello, 2011). Furthermore, in emerging markets like India, oligopolistic players such as those in the milk and cement industries have been accused of anticompetitive behavior via cartel formation (Edwin, 2012). Thus, despite having high market power and the ability to manipulate markets, firms in duopolistic markets have successfully kept regulatory authorities at bay while those in oligopolistic markets like Cadbury or Unilever–—supposedly to be more competitive–—have caught the attention of regulatory authorities. How was this possible? Duopoly firms, despite having high market power, always signal aggressive competitive behavior to regulatory authorities, unlike the oligopolistic firms mentioned above. When considering the parameters of CR or HF, policy makers now realize limitations. For example, high market power does not imply anticompetitive behavior, as explained above. Regulators now focus on the price-cost margin approach, which relies on profit margin and profitability differences of firms in the industry, to predict likelihood of cartel formation (Boone, 2004): the greater the profit margin, the lesser the competition. For example, De Beers, which enjoyed a premium profit margin in the diamond industry–—as it controlled the majority of the diamond supply–—was consequently charged with cartel formation by U.S. Government authorities. But at the same time, in the computing industry, firmssuch as Apple–—whose profit margin was around 20%–—behaved far more competitively compared to firms in the lighting industry, like Philips. Philips had a profit margin of 4.5% and yet was found to indulge in anticompetitive practices of cartel formation (Meller, 2009). According to the profit-margin approach, when competitive intensity in the industry increases, efficient firms perform much better, causing profits to shift from less efficient to more efficient firms. Consequently, the profitability gap between firms increases. But firms’ efficient operation depends largely on their competitive strategies. Hence, as they operate on economies of scale, low-cost players will be more efficient compared to firms pursuing a differentiation strategy. But this does not imply that differentiated players are less competitive; it means they are simply less efficient 442 A. Agnihotri by virtue of high investments in marketing and research and development. Even though relative profit difference can indicate competition level, this method has its own weaknesses.
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کلمات کلیدی:
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