دانلود رایگان مقاله لاتین تنوع فرهنگی در قدرت هنجار اجتماعی از سایت الزویر
عنوان فارسی مقاله:
تهدید اجتماعی و تنوع فرهنگی در قدرت هنجارهای اجتماعی: پایه تکاملی
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
Societal threat and cultural variation in the strength of social norms: An evolutionary basis
سال انتشار : 2015
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بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی:
Methods
Our evolutionary game theoretic model is designed to understand the process of cultural adaptation of populations of agents in both cooperation games and coordination games. Agents interact in a game phase and then in a punishment phase. Agents receive payoffs from these interactions and reproduce according to fitness. As a measure of the norm strength in a population, we use the percentage of agents who adhere to the norm, and the proportion of norm-enforcers - agents that would punish others for deviating from the norm. Our results are comprised of the evolutionary outcomes of the process of cultural adaptation, including the evolutionary trajectories of behaviors and the composition of behaviors in populations that have arrived at a stable state. We determine these results through multi-agent computer simulations. Since we are specifically interested how societal threat shapes the evolutionary pressures and outcomes in the cultural adaptation process, we explore our model under varying degrees of societal threat, implemented as follows. First, our model assumes agents all acquire a base payoff (base-pay) from the environment, independent of the game interactions that we model explicitly. This is an abstraction that serves to capture the fact that our game models just one of the many kinds of interactions that individuals might have in a more realistic world. Then, the level of societal threat is implemented by subtracting an amount s from this base payoff. Since threats like drought, hurricanes, tornadoes, famine, or hostile invasions all can reasonably be assumed to reduce the general payoff that agents in a population receive from their environment, implementing threat in this manner captures the essential effect of a broad array of threats. For instance, ecological threats are related to the availability of natural resources in that they often diminish agricultural yields and engender food shortages (Popp, 2006), and managing them often requires the use of the population’s resources. After agents receive the base payoff and payoffs from their interactions, the total acquired payoff p is transformed to reproductive fitness through a fitness function that captures the wellestablished principle of diminishing marginal utility, i.e. increased payoffs produce diminishing marginal increases in fitness. This diminishing marginal utility captures the concept that the fifth meal of a day is not as important to an agent’s fitness or well being as the first. A fitness transformation with this property is supported by an abundance of evidence across disciplines that increased resources lead to diminishing increases in utility (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2002; Diener, Kahneman, Tov, & Arora, 2010; Foster, 2004; Frey & Stutzer, 2010; Veenhoven, 1989), and has appeared in several other works that use evolutionary game theory to study social or biological evolution (Foster, 2004; Godfray, 1991; Grodzinski & Johnstone, 2012). The transformation of payoff p into fitness that we use is given by fðpÞ ¼ 1 e0:1p, which captures the notion that increased payoffs (p) produce diminishing marginal increases in fitness.1 Different levels of threat are implemented through a threat level that reduces the agents’ base payoff by an amount s. Note the payoff p that goes into the fitness function is the total payoff an agent has acquired, including the base payoff. So accounting for threat s, we have an agent’s payoff p = base-pay s + x, where x is the payoff an agent acquires from its game interactions that we model. Hence, the level of threat shifts an agent’s reference point (the payoff it has before interactions) to the left or to the right on the fitness curve. At very high levels of threat, the reference point is shifted far to the left, and the fitness of agent is close to 0 no matter how much payoff they acquire from the game interactions modeled. In this case agents the death rate wipes out the population; analogous to a catastrophic event that kills off a population, we are left with an empty grid. At very low levels of threat, the reference point is shifted far to the right on the fitness curve, where marginal returns of payoffs are negligible since the curve flattens more and more the higher the payoffs get. In this case, differences in game-payoffs again have very little effect on reproductive fitness, and all agents are effectively in a state of neutral drift. Since such extreme levels of high or low threat render the evolutionary outcomes trivial, our results generally focus on threat levels of 0 6 s 6 30. Ou
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کلمات کلیدی:
How culture gets embrained: Cultural differences in event-related ... https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4687606/ by Y Mu - 2015 - Cited by 34 - Related articles Nov 30, 2015 - Combining a new social norm violation paradigm with cross-cultural ...... Lun J. Societal threat and cultural variation in the strength of social ... Patrick Roos - Google Scholar Citations scholar.google.com/citations?user=7YmvMk0AAAAJ&hl=en Data Scientist at Miner & Kasch - cs.umd.edu Societal threat and cultural variation in the strength of social norms: An ... Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 281 (1776 ..., 2014. Using Game Theory to Study the Evolution of Cultural Norms https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.02570 by S De - 2016 - Cited by 3 - Related articles Jun 6, 2016 - party punishment, showing that societal threat directly controls the strength of ..... considerable cross-cultural variation in norms for fairness, ... Societal threat as a moderator of cultural group selection https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/.../core-reader Mar 9, 2016 - Societal threat as a moderator of cultural group selection .... Moreover, stronger N400 responses mediated cultural differences in a number of ...
