دانلود رایگان مقاله لاتین تضعیف عدم تقارن اطلاعات با تضمین پایداری از سایت الزویر
عنوان فارسی مقاله:
تضعیف عدم تقارن اطلاعات از طریق تضمین پایداری: نقش حسابداران و سطوح اطمینان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
Mitigating information asymmetry through sustainability assurance: The role of accountants and levels of assurance
سال انتشار : 2017
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بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی:
2. Theoretical background: sustainability reporting and information asymmetry
The rationale for this study is based on the fusion of two frameworks that justify the need for sustainability reporting and – more concretely – assured information: (i) stakeholder theory; (ii) agency theory. Drawing on stakeholder theory, voluntary corporate disclosures play a fundamental role in the functioning of an efficient capital market. In relation to voluntary disclosure and subsequent assurance demand, it argues the need for organizations to interact with a broad set of stakeholders to ensure their long-term survival through the so-called “social contract” between the firm and society (Deegan, Cooper, & Shelly, 2006); as Ullman (1985) suggested, the social and environmental commitment is a mechanism for dealing with stakeholders’ demands. Moreover, most large companies are owned by a multitude of shareholders and investors. Such companies are characterized by a clear separation between property and control, which is the basis for agency theory. According to this theory, a shareholder (the principal) delegates the management of the firm to managers (agents). The latter should act in line with the former's goals and intentions; however, the principal and the agents have different interests, leading managers to act in their own self-interests. It is difficult for the principal to control managers because of differences in access to information (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The different abilities to access corporate information may generate expropriation issues as a result of information asymmetries between the two (Shleifer & Vishny, 1992). In this agency context, firms can combat market frictions by increasing corporate disclosure, thus inducing the optimal functioning of an efficient capital market (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Firms that consistently make quality disclosures are perceived in the market to have a lower likelihood of withholding relevant unfavourable information and thus they are accorded a lower risk in the market (Sengupta, 1998). Thus, information is highly appreciated by investors, who employ corporate disclosures to evaluate their investment opportunities (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). In this regard, a number of studies have suggested that corporate disclosures tend to reduce information asymmetry as an agency cost. For example, Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) found a negative link between disclosure quality and the firms’ bid-ask spread as a proxy for information asymmetry. Voluntary sustainability disclosures contribute to reducing the information asymmetry that arises from differences in information available to and held by stakeholders (Cormier, Ledous, & Magnan, 2011; Healy et al., 1999; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Verrecchia, 2001). Informed stakeholders – usually managers – have access to more data than uninformed ones, who have access only to public information. Thus, voluntary sustainability information may contribute to an increase in information accuracy, a reduction in the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and thus asymmetry between more and less informed stakeholders (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011; Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, & Yang, 2012; Verrecchia, 2001). In this regard, Schipper (1991) suggested that the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts can be viewed as a measure of investors’ uncertainty about a firm's future economic performance, which arises from information asymmetries between the different stakeholders. Similarly, Lang and Lundholm (1996) documented that companies reporting additional non-financial information enjoy greater accuracy and less volatility in forecast revisions, which reduces the estimation risk and the information asymmetry problem.
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