دانلود رایگان مقاله لاتین تاثیر مهاجرت در بازار کار اصطکاکی از سایت الزویر
عنوان فارسی مقاله:
اثرات مهاجرت در بازار کار اصطکاکی: نظریه و شواهد تجربی از کشورهای اتحادیه اروپا
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
The effects of immigration in frictional labor markets: Theory and empirical evidence from EU countries
مقاله سال 2016
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بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی:
2. The model
We employ a simple theoretical framework as a guideline for our empirical investigations. We present a particular case of Ortega (2000)'s framework with exogenous migration and rigid wages.5 For the sake of generality, we consider a labor market composed of two types of labor suppliers, immigrants and natives who, as in Ortega (2000), are perfect substitutes. Immigrants and natives differ with respect to their outside opportunities of employment. For instance, immigrants arriving in a host country are likely to be non-eligible to unemployment benefits, they are likely to have a lower value of domestic production or leisure than natives, and they certainly lack other valuable assets. As a result, when considering the immigrant population as a whole, their average outside opportunity of employment is lower than that of natives. Due to their lower outside opportunity of employment, immigrants accept a lower wage from firms. Immigrants are thus a more profitable group of workers from the firm's point of view, since they are as productive as natives but they are willing to work for lower wages. When the proportion of immigrants in the active population increases, firms' average expected profits increase, promoting the opening of new vacancies.6 This positive externality could still arise even if immigrants had a relatively lower (or even higher) productivity. As long as the difference between the value of productivity and wages is greater for immigrants than for natives, immigrants remain more profitable workers and are thus the source of a positive externality. For simplicity, we consider here that both types of workers are identical apart from the reservation wage. 2.1. The matching process We use the subscript j ¼ N; I when referring to a native or an immigrant (foreign-born) worker. The workforce P is such that P ¼ PI þPN. Natives and immigrants may be employed ðnjÞ or unemployed ðujÞ, and the number of vacancies is denoted by v. The matching function can be written as: M ¼ mðv; uN þuIÞ. We assume that a standard Cobb–Douglas matching function of the form M ¼ m0ðvÞ 1=2ðuN þuIÞ 1=2. Labor market opportunities are described by the market tightness variable θ ¼ v=ðuN þuIÞ. The probability for a firm to fill an empty vacancy equals qðθÞ ¼ M=v. The probability of finding a job for an unemployed worker is given by pðθÞ ¼ M=ðuN þuIÞ. 7 2.2. The agents' behavior 2.2.1. Workers Employed workers are paid a wage wj. Jobs are destroyed at the exogenous probability s. For j ¼ N; I, the asset value of employment for natives and immigrants is given by rEj ¼ wj þsðUj EjÞ, where r stands for the interest rate, rUj ¼ bj þpðθÞðEj UjÞ for the asset value of unemployment and bj for the outside option of employment. Note that bN 4bI. 2.2.2. Firms From the firm's point of view, the asset value associated with an empty vacancy is given by minus the cost of posting this vacancy, γ, plus the surplus obtained by the firm if it manages to fill the vacancy. The firm can only observe the worker's type at the time of the match and cannot discriminate between unemployed natives or unemployed immigrants. Firms thus cannot select their applicants. The possibility of rejecting an applicant that provides a positive surplus is not considered here. Actually, it is optimal for firms to fill the vacancy as long as the surplus associated with the match is positive rather than leaving it unfilled and bearing a per period cost γ while waiting for a better worker to come in.8 The value of an empty vacancy is given by rV ¼ γþqðθÞðJ VÞ ð1Þ where J represents the expected value of a filled vacancy. The value of a filled vacancy is defined by the instantaneous profit hwj associated with the job (productivity minus the wage), plus the expected loss if the vacancy becomes empty due to an exogenous job destruction shock: rJj ¼ hwj þsðV JjÞ j ¼ natives; immigrants ð2Þ The expected value of a filled vacancy equals a weighted average J ¼ ω1JI þ ð1ω1ÞJN, where ω1 ¼ uI ðuN þuIÞ . Firms open vacancies until no more profit can be obtained so that, at equilibrium, the free-entry condition V¼0 applies, i.e.: γ qðθÞ ¼ J ¼ hω1wI ð1ω1ÞwN rþs ð3Þ The cost born by the firm while the vacancy remains empty must equal the expected value of a filled vacancy. 2.3. Wage
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کلمات کلیدی:
Effects of immigration in frictional labor markets: theory and empirical ... https://wwwen.uni.lu/.../effects_of_immigration_in_frictional_labor_markets_theory_an... Speaker: Eva Moreno Galbis (University of Angers). Event date: Wednesday, 19 December 2012, 13:00 - 14:00. Place: Campus Limpertsberg - Centre for ... The effects of immigration in frictional labor markets: theory and ... - Core https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/52408140.pdf Oct 6, 2015 - Immigrants are newcomers in a labor market. As a consequence, they lack host- country-specific labor market knowledge and other ... Effects of Immigration in Frictional Labor Markets: Theory and ... - AMSE https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/.../effects-immigration-frictional-labor-markets-theory-... The research program. The consequences of immigration on labor market outcomes and host country welfare are at the forefront of the policy debate and have ... Eva Moreno-Galbis, Ahmed Tritah, The effects of immigration in ... https://www.researchgate.net/.../303673163_Eva_Moreno-Galbis_Ahmed_Tritah_The_e... On May 1, 2016 Ahmed Tritah (and others) published: Eva Moreno-Galbis, Ahmed Tritah, The effects of immigration in frictional labor markets: Theory and ...
