دانلود رایگان مقاله لاتین بررسی عملکرد بالای رئیس مدیر عامل مدیران داخلی از سایت الزویر
عنوان فارسی مقاله:
اجتناب از سندرم "بیش از حد راحت بودن": به دست آوردن عملکرد بالای رئیس، مدیر عامل و مدیران داخلی
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
Avoiding the “too comfortable in the saddle” syndrome: Obtaining high performance from the chairperson, CEO and inside directors
سال انتشار : 2016
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بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی:
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses
2.1. Theoretical background There has been a greater interest in and focus on governance research and practice since the stock market crash of 1987, and the global financial crisis of the 2000s has reinforced this trend. Governance research considers a wide range of issues including but not limited to chief executive officer (CEO) and director selection, the job attributes and tenure of the chair and CEO respectively, the average tenure and ratio of inside directors, the ratio and tenure of outside directors, board size, teamwork on the board, and board effectiveness. Achieving and maintaining the effective contribution of the chair, CEO and board of director members to organization performance through selection, tenure and board process are matters of robust debate in business and academic communities around the world (Johnson et al., 1996; Dalton & Dalton, 2005; Hambrick, Verder, & Zajac, 2008; Fuenzalida, Mongrut, Artega, & Erausquin, 2013). Time and employee tenure are important research concepts (Mosakowski & Earley, 2000; Simsek, 2007). Agency theory argues that CEOs and inside directors in a position of power and influence will make opportunistic decisions in their own interests possibly to the detriment of the firm's goals and the interests of the owner's they are working for (Johnson et al., 1996; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). A recommended solution to the principal– agent problem is separation of the role of the chair and the CEO (Dalton & Dalton, 2005; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2007). A trend in the governance literature is greater emphasis on the importance of a strong outside director ratio, a voting majority of outside directors, an outside director as chair and high outside director average tenure to counter balance the principal–agent problem that can emerge in the work performance of the CEO and inside directors (Johnson et al., 1996; Walters, Kroll, & Wright, 2007). Advocates of agency theory also recommend a small number of inside directors on the board to provide an internal monitoring role and to advise the board on the activities and work performance of the CEO (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Johnson et al., 1996). Stewardship theory argues that company directors are essentially trustworthy individuals and good stewards of firm resources. There is a high level of goal alignment between the shareholders, inside directors and outside directors. Each of these stakeholders is committed to the long run survival and prosperity of the firm and therefore will work in the firm's best interests (Lynall et al., 2003). Advocates of stewardship theory support the presence of inside directors on the board. With this approach inside directors take on more of an advising role (Fama & Jensen, 1983). They argue that board of director design prescriptions of agency theorists can be counter-productive and an impediment to decision-making. A balance of inside and outside directors improves board deliberation and organization performance (Johnson et al., 1996). Stewardship theory also applies well to small and medium size enterprises which are characterized by strong executive identification with the firm, an involvement-oriented executive, low levels of institutional power, social fulfillment and personal ful- fillment of the executives (Johnson et al., 1996; Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007).
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Avoiding the "too comfortable in the saddle" syndrome : obtaining high ... https://www.econbiz.de/.../avoiding-the-too-comfortable-in-the-saddle-syndrome.../10... Avoiding the "too comfortable in the saddle" syndrome : obtaining high performance from the chairperson, CEO and inside directors. Timothy O'Shannassy, Mark ... Recently added - PEARL Home https://pearl.plymouth.ac.uk/handle/10026.1/280/recent-submissions?offset=100 Items 101 - 110 of 747 - Avoiding the “too comfortable in the saddle” syndrome: Obtaining high performance from the chairperson, CEO and inside directors . 分享到 QQ空间 新浪微博 人人网 豆瓣网 首页出版物导航 用户协会 博客 ... en.ahau.findplus.cn/?h=search_list&query=JN...elsevier Translate this page Avoiding the “too comfortable in the saddle” syndrome: Obtaining high performance from the chairperson, CEO and inside directors. Academic Journal. Using Single Respondents in Strategy Research - Bowman - 1997 ... onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8551.0045/full by C Bowman - 1997 - Cited by 199 - Related articles Abstract. A survey of empirical papers has revealed a number of studies that have used single respondents, usually the CEO or a top management team ... Duties and Responsibilities of Company Directors and Officers. 2002 ... https://bridgettmh.surge.sh/157doc.html ... Mark A.A.M. Leenders , Avoiding the “too comfortable in the saddle” syndrome: customer from the chairperson, CEO and inside directors, Journal of Business ... Journal of Business Research Volume 69 Issue 12 | DeepDyve https://www.deepdyve.com/browse/journals/journal-of-business-research/2016/.../i12 Avoiding the “too comfortable in the saddle” syndrome: Obtaining high performance from the chairperson, CEO and inside directors · When the chairperson and ... Associate editor reflections on the Progress in and Future of strategic ... https://www.cambridge.org/.../A3B6F73CDC54505864AAE39C8FB1406F Jun 28, 2017 - Avoiding the 'too comfortable in the saddle' syndrome: Obtaining high performance from the chairperson, CEO and inside directors. Journal of ... Board Composition and Corporate Performance: how the Australian ... www.springerprofessional.de/the-changing-role-of-the...of.../1467-8683.00318 By continuing to browse this site you agree to us using cookies as described in About Cookies. Notice: Wiley Online Library will be unavailable on Saturday 25th ...
