دانلود رایگان مقاله لاتین افزایش CSR تحت عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی از سایت الزویر
عنوان فارسی مقاله:
افزایش مسئولیت اجتماعی شرکتی: طراحی قرارداد تحت عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
Enhancing Corporate Social Responsibility: Contract Design under Information Asymmetry
سال انتشار : 2017
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بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی:
. Related literature
A few researchers in the supply chain management area have studied CSR. Goering [9] proposes a marketing chain for CSR coordination. Barcos et al. [10] examine the influence of CSR on firms’ inventory policy, while Ranangen and Zobel [11] study CSR in the extractive industries and forestry. Hsueh and Chang [12] and Cruz [13, 14] focus on CSR in supply chain networks. Servaes and Tamayo [15] show hat CSR and firm value are positively related for firms with high customer awareness. In contrast, Ni et al. [16] and Ni and Li [17] study the impact of exogenous factors on CSR commitment, while Hsueh [18] embeds CSR to coordinate a two-stage supply chain. Panda [19] uses a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the CSR manufacturer-retailer chain. Unlike the above literature, we employ different decision structures to design the contracts for an asymmetric supply chain. In particular, we focus on designing the best contract from the perspective of a brand name retailer (e.g., Apple), with the aim of improving its CM’s CSR efforts. Our paper differs considerably from the literature. The main differences between our model and those in the literature are summarized in Table 1a. In addition to CSR activities, our emphasis is on information asymmetry. Thus, we will focus on the discussion of information asymmetry in the following subsections.2.1 Cost information asymmetry Corbett et al. [20] examine the value of attaining better information on buyers’ 8 cost structure, while Liu and Cetinkaya [21] consider a buyer-driven supply chain. Cachon and Zhang [22] develop a queuing model to select a single supplier whose costs are private information. Mukhopadhyay et al. [23] investigate channel coordination under both the complete and asymmetric information cases. By extending the result of [23], Yao et al. [24] consider a supply chain with two value-adding heterogeneous retailers. Similarly, Mukhopadhyay et al. [25, 26] develop optimal contracts for mixed channels under asymmetric cost information. Kaya and Ozer [27] investigate two quality risk factors: (i) no contract on quality and (ii) no information about the CM’s quality cost. Ozer and Raz [28] study the effect of smaller suppliers’ production costs on profits and contracting decisions. Meanwhile, Xu et al. [29] consider a leading supplier with price-setting power and an urgent supplier with private cost information. Finally, Kim and Netessine [30] investigate the impact of information asymmetry and procurement contracts on SC members’ incentives to collaborate.
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کلمات کلیدی:
Enhancing brand preference through corporate social responsibility ... www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdf/10.1108/13555851011062296 by R Chomvilailuk - 2010 - Cited by 63 - Related articles A 2 × 2 × 2 between subject experimental design was used to test the hypotheses in a bank setting. Three CSR initiatives were tested against a predictor ... Searches related to Enhancing Corporate Social Responsibility mckinsey corporate social responsibility corporate social responsibility strategy template corporate social responsibility initiatives and examples 4 benefits of corporate social responsibility how to improve corporate social responsibility in a company list of corporate social responsibility activities corporate social responsibility articles 2016 csr plan example
