دانلود رایگان مقاله لاتین ارتباط کیفیت افشا و کیفیت گزارش از سایت الزویر
عنوان فارسی مقاله:
رابطه بین کیفیت افشا و کیفیت گزارش: بحث در مورد کاسل، مایرز، و سیدل (2015)
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
The relation between disclosure quality and reporting quality: A discussion of Cassell, Myers, and Seidel (2015)
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مقدمه انگلیسی مقاله:
1. Introduction
Cassell, Myers, and Seidel (2015, CMS) examine the relation between the transparency of disclosures about activity in the bad-debt allowance, inventory allowance, and deferred tax assets allowance accounts and accruals-based earnings management. The study finds that firms manipulate earnings through accruals to a smaller degree when they provide transparent disclosures about activity in these allowance accounts. The authors also find that the placement of such transparent disclosures, whether in a summary schedule presented after the financial statements and notes or spread throughout the notes to the financial statements, does not provide additional information about firms’ accruals-based earnings management. The findings suggest that users of financial reports may use firms’ disclosure behavior as a signal of firms’ reporting behavior.1 CMS is distinctive in three ways. First, CMS is one of a few studies that investigate the reporting of individual accounts for evidence of earnings management (Jackson & Liu, 2010; Marquardt & Wiedman, 2004; McNichols & Wilson, 1988; Schrand & Wong, 2003). Studying individual accounts for earnings management behavior not only overcomes some measurement problems that researchers face (e.g., what do unmanaged earnings look like? Which aggregate earnings do managers target?), but also provides insights into how earnings are managed. Second, CMS is one of a limited number of studies that examine the disclosure of particular corporate activities. The vast majority of disclosure studies focus on management earnings forecasts (MEF)—managers’ projections of a summary operating performance measure. This focus is due to the importance of earnings in measuring performance and the availability of machine-readable data. In practice, managers provide many types of disclosures beyond MEF, either voluntarily or with discretion in deciding what to disclose and how to disclose mandatorily required items. Yet, very few studies have examined the disclosure of particular corporate activities (e.g., capital expenditures, inventory management, and warranties) and data in these studies are typically hand collected (Brown, Gordon, & Wermers, 2006; Cohen, Masako, Huang, & Zach, 2011; Sun, 2012). Examining particular activities complements traditional MEF research and helps investors, regulators, and practitioners understand a firm’s disclosure strategy as a whole. Last, and more important, CMS is one of a few archival studies that investigate the relation between financial reporting and disclosure. Because the same management makes the reporting and disclosure decisions, such investigations may uncover signals that investors can glean from one type of managerial behavior and use to better understand the other type of managerial behavior. Financial reporting and disclosure differ in two main respects. First, annual financial statements are audited; quarterly financial statements are closely reviewed by auditors even though they are not audited. In contrast, disclosure is not audited, except for the notes to the financial statements in annual reports. From the perspective of auditor involvement, managerial discretion is larger for disclosure than for reporting. Second, reporting is quantitative, whereas most disclosure is qualitative. Managers have more discretion in qualitative representation, because they can decide on the length, tone, complexity, modifications, etc. beyond the numeric presentation, than in quantitative representation. Given these differences, managers’ decisions in disclosure settings can reveal a wealth of information for investors to gauge the implications of financial reporting. On the other hand, managers’ reporting decisions may help investors better understand corporate disclosures. Three aspects of the relation between disclosure quality and reporting quality are worth exploring: (1) joint decision making, (2) incentives, and (3) temporal variation.2 The joint-decision-making nature of the relation leads to two interesting questions. Is disclosure quality a stronger signal for reporting quality or vice versa? Do managers use their discretion in reporting and disclosure as complementary or substitutive tools? Incentives are key to understanding and predicting how managers use their reporting and disclosure discretion. Are incentives present in the suspected cases of managerial misuse of discretion? What are the incentives that lead managers to use discretion in reporting versus the incentives that lead them to use discretion in disclosure? Temporary variation or the lack of it can be considered a constraint to managers’ use of discretion. How feasible is it for managers to use their discretion in reporting or in disclosure in the same way from year to year? To what extent can a sticky corporate policy for the strategy of reporting explain temporal variation in the disclosure strategy, and vice versa? In my view, the most important contribution of CMS is to shed light on the relation between disclosure quality and reporting quality. This contribution, however, seems to be incidental. CMS couch their study in the ‘‘detection’’ story instead of in the joint decision of reporting and disclosure. They argue that the likelihood of detection decreases when a required disclosure is not transparent and therefore predict that firms whose disclosure of the allowance accounts is not transparent are more likely to manipulate the reporting of these accounts. CMS ignore the fact that the same management simultaneously makes the reporting and disclosure decisions. In addition, CMS implicitly assume that managers have incentives to report higher earnings and do not identify situations when such incentives are especially strong or absent. Moreover, CMS do not address the issue of stickiness in corporate reporting and disclosure. These comments are less about the shortcomings of CMS, but more about the opportunities for future research. In the next three sections I discuss extant literature; the contribution of CMS; and future research opportunities related to the joint decision making, incentives, and temporal variation aspects of the relation between disclosure quality and reporting quality. Then, I discuss a few execution issues in CMS. A short summary follows
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کلمات کلیدی:
The relation between disclosure quality and reporting ... - ScienceDirect www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0361368215000574 by JW Tucker - 2015 - Cited by 3 - Related articles Jun 6, 2015 - I use the opportunity of commenting on Cassell, Myers, and Seidel (CMS) to discuss the broader issue of the relation between disclosure ... [PDF]The relation between disclosure quality and reporting quality: A ... iranarze.ir/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/E19.pdf by JW Tucker - 2015 - Cited by 3 - Related articles broader issue of the relation between disclosure quality and reporting quality. Three aspects of this relation are worth exploring: (1) joint decision making, ... You visited this page on 3/13/17. The Relation between Disclosure Quality and Reporting ... - SSRN papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2606192 May 15, 2015 - I use the opportunity of commenting on Cassell, Myers, and Seidel (CMS) to discuss the broader issue of the relation between disclosure ... [PDF]A survey of the relationship between disclosure quality (on time and ... european-science.com/eojnss/article/viewFile/478/pdf by S Papi - 2013 - Related articles risk, the relation between disclosure quality and ac- cruals management is not ... time for presenting the report is more close to the date of the end of fiscal year, ...
