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عنوان فارسی مقاله:
اثر اطلاعات نامتقارن بر نتایج بازار کالا
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
The effect of asymmetric information on product market outcomes
سال انتشار : 2016
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بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی:
2. Theoretical underpinnings and related literature
In this section we review the model by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and introduce testable implications. We also place our work in the context of other empirical work linking asymmetric information shocks with corporate outcomes. 9 But we do not find evidence of increased dispersion in revenue forecasts. 2.1. Theoretical motivation The notion that financial constraints enable predation by peers requires a wedge to inhibit capital raising as a response to predatory threat. In other words, why do not investors simply provide financing when predation is a concern? Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) raise this question and show one potential countervailing wedge is the concern that unrestricted resource provision carries diversion (agency) concerns. They begin with endogenously derived financial constraints. Given investors’ resource diversion concerns with managers, it is optimal to commit to funding termination if a firm’s performance is poor. However, asymmetric information makes contracting on realized profit imperfect.10 Thus, the optimal contract imperfectly increases the sensitivity of (re)financing decisions to firm performance. Investors cut off funding too readily in the face of reduced profit outcomes. This increased sensitivity comes with a cost—it enables predation. Competitors recognize that aggressive pricing11 can lower a prey’s profit, which can cause funding termination and the prey’s premature exit from the product market space. In turn, the predator benefits from a less competitive product market. Overall, the investor faces a tradeoff. A contract that tilts more towards protecting against resource diversion encourages predation, but more forgiving funding continuation enables greater resource diversion. Evaluating the empirical validity of this theory is complicated by endogenous relationships. Our use of the natural experiments of brokerage mergers/closures that exogenously reduce analyst coverage has the potential to break that endogenous link. Given evidence (discussed below) that these shocks raise asymmetric information, we can test the theory’s implication that heightened agency concerns (driven by the greater difficulties contracting on reported profits) tilt the optimal contract away from addressing predation concerns. In other words, we expect an analyst shock to cause contract tightening by investors and therefore greater predation by the shocked firm’s competitors, leading to market share loss for the shocked firm. This forms the basis of our Hypothesis 1 (offered in alternative form). Hypothesis 1 (H1). Firms that lose coverage (due to brokerage house merger/closure) subsequently lose market share.
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کلمات کلیدی:
[DOC]Discuss the reasons why asymmetric information can be a source of ... is.esade.edu/faculty/.../Asymmetric%20Information%20&%20Market%20Failure.doc by A Sweeting - Cited by 2 - Related articles In the analysis of asymmetric information in markets, ex ante and ex post ... of goods in the product market, and ex post asymmetric information can be explained .... an increased probability of undesired outcomes for one party and the market, ... Asymmetric Information: Subject Matter and Implications www.economicsdiscussion.net/market/asymmetric-information-subject-matter.../1722... The most frequently cited example of asymmetric information is the market of ... have more information about the hidden or unobservable qualities of the product ... Issues in Regional Economics: 2012 Edition: ScholarlyBrief https://books.google.com/books?isbn=1481648764 2013 - Business & Economics ... Of Asymmetric Information Within A Firm 0n Oligopolistic Market Outcomes “I ... a menu of contract to its manager, and then competes in the product market.
