دانلود رایگان مقاله لاتین اثر تعارض آژانس بین مدیران و عملکرد صاحبان از سایت الزویر
عنوان فارسی مقاله:
چگونه تاثیر تعارض آژانس بین مدیران و عملکرد صاحبان خانواده در شرکت های کاملا متعلق به خانواده : دیدگاه نسل
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
How agency conflict between family managers and family owners affects performance in wholly family-owned firms: A generational perspective
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مقدمه انگلیسی مقاله:
1. Introduction
The literature on family firms has extensively analyzed the effect of family owner management on firm performance. Researchers have employed agency theory arguments to suggest both positive and negative effects (e.g., Basco, 2013; Bennedsen, Nielsen, Pérez-González, & Wolfenzon, 2007; Block, Jaskiewicz, & Miller, 2011; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007). Proponents of the negative view usually focus on the expropriation by the main shareholder (i.e., the family) of minority shareholders (nonfamily members). The alignment of family managers with family objectives rather than business objectives (Miller, Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2013) may impair family firm performance (Basco, 2013; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2002; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003a; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003b; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). But conflicts of interest may also exist between family members who are both owners and managers (henceforth “active family owners”) and other family owners who do not participate in firm management (“passive family owners”) (Basco, 2013; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005; Miller et al., 2013; Schulze et al., 2003a; Siebels & zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2012). Active family owners may misallocate firm resources for the particular benefit of their own nuclear family at the expense of other family branches. For example, they may hire incompetent relatives from their nuclear family for key positions, pay these family members salaries that are higher than competitive rates, or give them rewards that are not aligned with performance. In turn, these behaviors may impair the firm's performance (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007). Governance mechanisms may control this intra-family agency conflict and improve performance. For instance, passive family owners may discipline the behavior of active family owners by directly controlling them (Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, & Chang, 2007) or by having a board of directors monitor them (e.g., Audretsch, Hülsbeck, & Lehmann, 2013). Furthermore, specific family governance mechanisms (succession plans, family protocols, and family councils) may help regulate the economic and family relationships between active and passive family owners (Corbetta & Salvato, 2012; Poza, Hanlon, & Kishida, 2004). However, empirical studies on the role that governance mechanisms play in the agency conflict between active family owners and passive family owners are still rare (Siebels & zu KnyphausenAufseß, 2012).
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کلمات کلیدی:
1. How agency conflict between family managers and family owners ... en.ahau.findplus.cn/n_index_findplus_en.php?h=articles... Translate this page Title: How agency conflict between family managers and family owners affects performance in wholly family-owned firms: A generational perspective. Authors ... Is family leadership always beneficial? - Miller - 2012 - Strategic ... onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/smj.2024/abstract by D Miller - 2013 - Cited by 118 - Related articles Oct 9, 2012 - There has been much debate concerning the performance of family firms and the ... Some scholars have argued that family management is to blame when family ... they will do neither where firms are smaller and ownership is more ... How agency conflict between family managers and family owners affects ... Are Family Managers Agents or Stewards? An Exploratory ... - CiteSeerX citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1032.1952&rep=rep1...pdf by J Chua - 2007 - Cited by 290 - Related articles Clearly, agency problems between family firm owners and family managers would ... conflicting goals; (b) managers may pursue their own goals even to the detriment of .... benefits, performance will also be adversely affected despite effective control over .... asymmetry is incomplete and does not wholly overlap that. 1033. Recent Journal of Family Business Strategy Articles - Elsevier https://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-family-business-strategy/recent-articles Apr 15, 2017 - How agency conflict between family managers and family owners affects performance in wholly family-owned firms: A generational perspective. [PDF]Corporate Governance in Family Firms_111014-Def - Wharton ... https://mgmt.wharton.upenn.edu/files/?whdmsaction=public:main.file&fileID... Agency Problem I: Conflict of interest between owners and managers ... result of these effects, they find that, just as with the question of family firms' prevalence, ... After Villalonga & Amit (2006), dozens of studies of family firm performance have ...... some level of ownership dispersion have higher payout ratios than wholly ... [PDF]The demand for auditor services in wholly family-owned private firms ... https://doclib.uhasselt.be/dspace/bitstream/1942/18084/1/15563.pdf by M CORTEN - 2015 - Cited by 3 - Related articles negative association between management ownership and the demand for ... focus solely on the audit demand effect of agency conflicts between family owner- ..... demonstrated performance and might therefore shirk) (Gomez-Mejia et al. Journal of Family Business Strategy - Terkko Navigator https://www.terkko.helsinki.fi/.../15247071_how-agency-conflict-b... Translate this page Aug 26, 2016 - How agency conflict between family managers and family owners affects performance in wholly family-owned firms: A generational perspective. [PDF]GovernanCe ChallenGes FoR FAMilY-oWnED BuSinESSES - OECD https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/43654301.pdf Better alignment of management and shareholder interests. ❯ ... family ownership and firm performance in large, publicly-traded U.S. firms listed on the S&P.
