دانلود رایگان مقاله لاتین آموزش آنلاین سرمایه انسانی از سایت الزویر
عنوان فارسی مقاله:
آموزش آنلاین، سیگنالینگ، و سرمایه انسانی
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
Online education, signaling, and human capital
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مقدمه انگلیسی مقاله:
1. Introduction
The increased use of online education could lead to significant changes in higher education (Acemgoglu, Laibson, and List, 2014). There are many issues involving online versus traditional (face-toface) higher education. One question is which method is better for learning. That issue has not been resolved. Some find worse performance in online courses versus traditional courses, some find the opposite, and some find no performance difference between the two delivery methods.1 An additional issue is whether online courses can lower time costs for students. Online courses have no commuting costs, and there is less repetition as students control what they watch (Cowen and Tabarrok, 2014). Students can study when they have peak energy, and can manage their time and complete assignments on their own schedules (OEDb, 2012, and University of Washington, 2013). Two studies provide evidence of reduced time costs with online courses. First, Bowen et al. (2013) examine statistics classes at six public universities in2011. Some students were randomly assigned to take a hybrid version of the course in which they had one hour per week of face-to-face instruction along with computer-guided instruction. Others took the traditional course with three to four hours of face-to-face instruction per week. On average, students in the hybrid course spent about25% less total time on the course than did those in the traditional course. Note that students in the two different kinds of courses had no statistically significant differences in learning outcomes such as pass rates and scores on common exam questions. A second study is based on statistics courses at Carnegie Mellon University in 2005 and 2006. Students volunteered to participate in an online only class with no instructor.2 Some of these volunteers were randomly chosen to participate in the online course. These students performed as well or better than those in the traditional class (not controlling for demographic characteristics), and did so in about 50% of the time3 (Lovett et al., 2008). The evidence does not suggest whether online education reduces time cost by a relatively larger amount for certain students Posner (2012) notes how online classes have advantages for students who cannot work as fast as others. The ability to watch lectures online can reduce the total time costs for less able individuals more than for others because the former individuals spend less time trying to grasp material when they can watch a lecture at their own pace. 4 If education only adds to human capital, lowering cost for the less able benefits them and has no effect on others. Conversely, education may be used as a signal of (pre-matriculation) ability (Spence, 1974, 2002).5 Suppose education is only a signal, and does not affect productivity. Then, the lower the level of education, the greater is social welfare. Since the level of the signal is inversely related to the educational cost difference between more and less productive individuals, reducing this cost difference decreases welfare. I analyze a theoretical model in which education increases productivity and serves as a signal. My goal is to examine the effects on welfare of changing the educational time cost of the less able relative to that of the more able. Well before the advent of online education, Riley (1981) considered how lowering education cost for the less able could lower welfare: Consider “…the adoption of an innovation which increases the rate of educational advancement of the less able…The higher rate of educational advancement implies a reduction in the marginal time costs of education…and hence an increase in the education of…” the less able. The more able “…must increase their education….in order to be differentiated.”6 More recently, McAfee et al. (2015) suggests that the best subjects for signaling are those that are less useful or practical since they may imply the biggest cost difference between more and less able individuals: “…interpreting long medieval poems could more readily signal the kind of flexible mind desired in management than studying accounting, not because the desirable type is good at it, or that it is useful, but because the less desirable type is so much worse at it.”7 The idea of analyzing medieval poems suggested by McAfee et al. as a good signal is actually supported by some evidence. Bukszpan (2012) reports on the value of seemingly useless degrees. One individual majored in epic Renaissance literature, and works as a financial analyst. She claims her critical skills in analyzing literature are important in making smart investment choices. Of course, her education may have added to her analytical skills. However, it may also be true that some of what potential employers learned from her major is that she had the analytical skills required to master such a subject. That is the signaling role of education. I assume education adds to productivity and signals inherent ability.8 I develop a model in Section Two that enables me to con- 4 I ignore problems with online classes. Haynie (2014) argues that, at least for large scale online classes, completion rates are not good. Banerjee and Duflo (2014) note that only 5% of students enrolled in a large online graduate education course at the University of Pennsylvania completed the class. 5 In a study for the Social Science Research Council, Arum et al. (2011) find that 36% of U.S. college students learn very little after four years. One economist (Caplan, 2011) recently accepted the idea that little is learned in college, higher education is essentially a signal, and welfare would be improved if students spent fewer years in school. 6 Riley (1981), p.375. 7 McAfee et al. (2015), p.246. 8 Clark and Martorell (2014) consider the additional value of receiving a high school diploma, and argue there is little support for the signaling role of education. Their results do not exclude the possibility that the level of education (years of schooling, grade, etc.) affects productivity and serves as a signal of prematriculation ability. sider the effect on welfare of changing education cost for the less able. Online education may lower the cost of education for the less able relative to the more able. Alternatively, more rigorous courses may increase the cost of education for the less able relative to the more able. In Section Three, I consider numerical examples to provide further insight on the value of changing education cost for the less able. I summarize my findings in Section Four.
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کلمات کلیدی:
Bryan Caplan on College, Signaling and Human Capital | EconTalk ... www.econtalk.org/archives/2014/04/bryan_caplan_on.html Apr 7, 2014 - Bryan Caplan on College, Signaling and Human Capital ...... we've talked with others about MOOCs here, the online educational opportunities. [PDF]Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education ... - Semantic Scholar https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/afc5/dff63417c68168e92d6d9917c456ccd64f5f.pdf by P Arcidiacono - Cited by 181 - Related articles To comment on this article in the online discussion forum, or to view additional materials, visit the ... Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education and the. Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education and the Revelation ... https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.2.4.76 by P Arcidiacono - 2010 - Cited by 181 - Related articles Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education and the Revelation of Ability ... has considerable power in explaining racial differences in wages, education, and returns to ability. ... Download Data Set (3.77 MB) · Online Appendix (66.46 KB) ... [PDF]Web Appendix: Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education and ... https://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/app/2009-0106_app.pdf by AS Creation - Related articles Web Appendix: Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education and the Revelation of Ability. Peter Arcidiacono Patrick Bayer Aurel Hizmo. Duke University. [PDF]Education, human capital, and labor market signaling - MIT ... https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/economics/14-03...and.../MIT14_03F10_lec18.pdf Dec 5, 2010 - Lecture Note 1 8 – Education, Human Capital, and. Labor Market Signaling. 14.03/14.003, Microeconomic Theory and Public Policy, Fall 2009. Human capital or signaling? No, it's about doing the Right Thing and ... lesswrong.com/lw/k3g/human_capital_or_signaling_no_its_about_doing_the/ Apr 20, 2014 - There's a huge debate among economists of education on whether the positive relationship between educational attainment and income is due ...
